Apparatus and method for device whitelisting and blacklisting to override protections for allowed media at nodes of a protected system

ABSTRACT

A method includes detecting a peripheral device at a protected node. The method also includes determining whether the peripheral device has been checked-in for use with at least the protected node and determining whether the peripheral device or a device type has been whitelisted or blacklisted. The method further includes granting access to the peripheral device in response to (i) determining that the peripheral device has been checked-in and has not been blacklisted or (ii) determining that the peripheral device or the device type has been whitelisted, even if the peripheral device has not been checked-in. In addition, the method includes blocking access to the peripheral device in response to (i) determining that the peripheral device has not been checked-in and has not been whitelisted or (ii) determining that the peripheral device or the device type has been blacklisted, even if the peripheral device has been checked-in.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS AND PRIORITY CLAIM

This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) to thefollowing U.S. provisional patent applications:

-   -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,601 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING COMMAND        AND CONTROL PARAMETERS, CONFIGURATION DATA, AND OTHER DATA TO        NODES OF A PROTECTED SYSTEM USING SECURE MEDIA”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,637 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR BRIDGING        CYBER-SECURITY THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTO A PROTECTED SYSTEM USING        SECURE MEDIA”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,683 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR AUDITING FILE ACCESS        TO SECURE MEDIA BY NODES OF A PROTECTED SYSTEM”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,729 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR DEVICE        WHITELISTING AND BLACKLISTING TO OVERRIDE PROTECTIONS FOR        ALLOWED MEDIA AT NODES OF A PROTECTED SYSTEM”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,731 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR LOCKING AND        UNLOCKING REMOVABLE MEDIA FOR USE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PROTECTED        SYSTEMS”;    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,733 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD SUPPORTING SECURE DATA        TRANSFER INTO AND OUT OF PROTECTED SYSTEMS USING REMOVABLE        MEDIA”; and    -   U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/345,735 filed on Jun.        3, 2016 and entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR PREVENTING FILE        ACCESS BY NODES OF A PROTECTED SYSTEM”.

All of these provisional patent applications are hereby incorporated byreference in their entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to computing and network security.More specifically, this disclosure relates to an apparatus and methodfor device whitelisting and blacklisting to override protections forallowed media at nodes of a protected system.

BACKGROUND

Numerous organizations have private computing networks supporting sometype of access controls or other cyber-security controls to limitnetwork access. This is highly necessary in protected environments suchas industrial control systems, manufacturing plants or other facilities,hospitals or other healthcare facilities, and classified network areas.The need to transfer information into and out of secure networks has ledto the increased use of removable media, such as portable UniversalSerial Bus (USB) drives. Removable media are often used to moveinformation or files (such as application patches, diagnosticsapplications, or documentation) into or out of secure networks.Unfortunately, removable media provide a new vector for cyber-attacksinto protected systems. In many instances, removable media represent oneof the primary inbound vectors through which viruses and other malwarecan enter secure networks.

SUMMARY

This disclosure provides an apparatus and method for device whitelistingand blacklisting to override protections for allowed media at nodes of aprotected system.

In a first embodiment, an apparatus includes at least one interfaceconfigured to be coupled to a peripheral device. The apparatus alsoincludes at least one processing device configured to detect theperipheral device. The at least one processing device is also configuredto determine whether the peripheral device has been checked-in for usewith at least the apparatus and determine whether the peripheral deviceor a device type associated with the peripheral device has beenwhitelisted or blacklisted. The at least one processing device isfurther configured to grant access to the peripheral device in responseto at least one of (i) determining that the peripheral device has beenchecked-in for use with at least the apparatus and has not beenblacklisted and (ii) determining that the peripheral device or thedevice type has been whitelisted, even if the peripheral device has notbeen checked-in for use with at least the apparatus. In addition, the atleast one processing device is configured to block access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of (i) determining thatthe peripheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theapparatus and has not been whitelisted and (ii) determining that theperipheral device or the device type has been blacklisted, even if theperipheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theapparatus.

In a second embodiment, a method includes detecting a peripheral deviceat a protected node. The method also includes determining whether theperipheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and determining whether the peripheral device or a devicetype associated with the peripheral device has been whitelisted orblacklisted. The method further includes granting access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of (i) determining thatthe peripheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and has not been blacklisted and (ii) determining thatthe peripheral device or the device type has been whitelisted, even ifthe peripheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node. In addition, the method includes blocking access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of (i) determining thatthe peripheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and has not been whitelisted and (ii) determining thatthe peripheral device or the device type has been blacklisted, even ifthe peripheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node.

In a third embodiment, a non-transitory computer readable mediumcontains instructions that, when executed by at least one processingdevice, cause the at least one processing device to detect a peripheraldevice at a protected node. The medium also contains instructions that,when executed by the at least one processing device, cause the at leastone processing device to determine whether the peripheral device hasbeen checked-in for use with at least the protected node and determinewhether the peripheral device or a device type associated with theperipheral device has been whitelisted or blacklisted. The mediumfurther contains instructions that, when executed by the at least oneprocessing device, cause the at least one processing device to grantaccess to the peripheral device in response to at least one of (i)determining that the peripheral device has been checked-in for use withat least the protected node and has not been blacklisted and (ii)determining that the peripheral device or the device type has beenwhitelisted, even if the peripheral device has not been checked-in foruse with at least the protected node. In addition, the medium containsinstructions that, when executed by the at least one processing device,cause the at least one processing device to block access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of (i) determining thatthe peripheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and has not been whitelisted and (ii) determining thatthe peripheral device or the device type has been blacklisted, even ifthe peripheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node.

Other technical features may be readily apparent to one skilled in theart from the following figures, descriptions, and claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of this disclosure, reference is nowmade to the following description, taken in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example system supporting secure data transferusing removable media according to this disclosure;

FIG. 2 illustrates an example industrial process control and automationsystem in which removable media could be used according to thisdisclosure;

FIG. 3 illustrates an example device supporting secure data transferusing removable media according to this disclosure;

FIGS. 4 through 7B illustrate examples of handling removable media tosupport secure data transfer into and out of protected systems accordingto this disclosure;

FIGS. 8 through 11 illustrate example methods supporting secure datatransfer into and out of protected systems using removable mediaaccording to this disclosure; and

FIGS. 12 and 13 illustrate example methods supporting applications thatinvolve secure data transfer into and out of protected systems usingremovable media according to this disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIGS. 1 through 13, discussed below, and the various embodiments used todescribe the principles of the present invention in this patent documentare by way of illustration only and should not be construed in any wayto limit the scope of the invention. Those skilled in the art willunderstand that the principles of the invention may be implemented inany type of suitably arranged device or system.

As described above, removable media such as portable Universal SerialBus (USB) drives represent one of the primary inbound vectors throughwhich viruses and other malware can enter secure networks. Thisdisclosure provides techniques to control how files are moved into andout of a secure network using removable media. In particular, thisdisclosure describes how the use of a storage device (such as a USBdrive or other removable media) is supported using “check-in” and“check-out” processes. When the storage device is “checked-in,” thestorage device can be used with protected nodes of a secure network butnot with unprotected nodes. When the storage device is “checked-out,”the storage device can be used with unprotected nodes but not withprotected nodes of a secure network. By default, the storage device isconsidered checked-out until it undergoes the check-in procedure.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example system 100 supporting secure data transferusing removable media according to this disclosure. As shown in FIG. 1,the system 100 includes one or more protected system nodes 102 a-102 n.Each protected system node 102 a-102 n denotes a computing or networkingdevice that forms a part of a protected system. Each protected systemnode 102 a-102 n could perform any desired function or functions withina protected system. For example, a protected system node 102 a-102 ncould be used to perform functions related to industrial processcontrol, such as functions for controlling manufacturing plants or othermanufacturing facilities. A protected system node 102 a-102 n could alsobe used to store confidential data, such as in hospitals or otherhealthcare facilities or in classified network areas. Each protectedsystem node 102 a-102 n includes any suitable computing or networkingdevice that supports any desired function(s), such as a personalcomputer, laptop computer, or server computer running any suitableoperating system.

Each protected system node 102 a-102 n in this example includes a SECUREMEDIA EXCHANGE or “SMX” agent 103. Each SMX agent 103 controls ormanages the use of removable media with an associated protected systemnode 102 a-102 n. As described in more detail below, each SMX agent 103can determine whether a storage device has been “checked-in” byexamining contents of the storage device or the storage device itself.If the storage device has been checked-in, the SMX agent 103 allows theassociated protected system node 102 a-102 n to access and use thestorage device. If the storage device has not been checked-in, the SMXagent 103 blocks the use of the storage device by the associatedprotected system node 102 a-102 n. Various operations of the SMX agents103 are also described below. Each SMX agent 103 could be implemented inany suitable manner, such as by using one or more software or firmwareroutines executed by the associated protected system node 102 a-102 n.

The system 100 also includes one or more SMX kiosks 104. Each SMX kiosk104 is used to support the “check-in” and “check-out” processes forstorage devices. For example, when a user plugs a USB drive or otherstorage device into a suitable interface of an SMX kiosk 104, the usercould initiate a check-in procedure. Example functions of the check-inprocedure could include the SMX kiosk 104 scanning any files on thestorage device and determining whether viruses or other malware ispresent on the storage device. Example functions of the check-inprocedure could also include the SMX kiosk 104 quarantining any detectedmalware, storing various data (such as digital signatures or audit logs)on the storage device, possibly encrypting clean files on the storagedevice, and locking a file system of the storage device. At this point,the storage device is considered checked-in and therefore “trusted,” sothe storage device could be used with one, some, or all of the protectedsystem nodes 102 a-102 n but not with any untrusted nodes.

When a user plugs a checked-in USB drive or other storage device into asuitable interface of an SMX kiosk 104, the user could also initiate acheck-out procedure. Example functions of the check-out procedure couldinclude the SMX kiosk 104 scanning any new files on the storage deviceand determining whether viruses or other malware is present on thestorage device. Example functions of the check-out procedure could alsoinclude the SMX kiosk 104 quarantining any detected malware, removingvarious data (such as digital signatures or audit logs) from the storagedevice, decrypting various encrypted elements on the storage device, andunlocking the file system of the storage device. At that point, thestorage device is considered checked-out and therefore “untrusted,” sothe storage device could be used with untrusted nodes but not with theprotected system nodes 102 a-102 n.

Each SMX kiosk 104 includes any suitable device or system for checkingin and checking out removable media. Each SMX kiosk 104 could, forexample, denote a desktop computer, laptop computer, server computer, ortablet computer having at least one interface for coupling to removablemedia. Each SMX kiosk 104 in this example includes an SMX server 105.Each SMX server 105 can perform the check-in and check-out proceduresdescribed above and in more detail below. Various operations of the SMXserver 105 are also described below. Each SMX server 105 could beimplemented in any suitable manner, such as by using one or moresoftware or firmware routines executed by the associated SMX kiosk 104.

Collectively, the SMX agents 103 and the SMX servers 105 provide aninnovative approach for helping to ensure that information stored onremovable media is authorized, safe, and unaltered. For example, the SMXagents 103 prevent the normal operation of USB interfaces or otherperipheral device interfaces of the protected system nodes 102 a-102 nthat might be used to connect to a storage device unless the storagedevice is first authorized by one of the SMX servers 105. Onceauthorized, the storage device is made accessible to the protectedsystem nodes 102 a-102 n through the SMX agents 103. Additionally, theSMX servers 105 can authorize individual files in order to allow safefiles or file types to be brought into a protected system while blockingmalicious or unwanted files or file types. This can again be enforced bythe SMX agents 103, which block unauthorized files or file types at theprotected system nodes 102 a-102 n.

The system 100 uses the “check-in” and “check-out” mechanisms toauthorize removable media or specific files or file types on theremovable media. An end user wishing to use a storage device in aprotected system first allows an SMX server 105 to scan and authorizethe storage device, at which point the storage device is locked toprevent other uses of the storage device. Once locked, the storagedevice is only useable on protected system nodes 102 a-102 n havingappropriately configured and authorized SMX agents 103. When the user isfinished with his or her task, the storage device can be checked-outusing an SMX server 105, restoring the storage device to its normalfunctionality and preventing use of the storage device with theprotected system nodes 102 a-102 n.

The check-in and check-out mechanisms of the SMX servers 105 and theoperations of the SMX agents 103 are able to maintain an audit trail offile transfers to and from a storage device. The check-in and check-outmechanisms of the SMX servers 105 and the operations of the SMX agents103 are also able to pass configuration parameters, event logs, or otherdata between protected system nodes 102 a-102 n and an unprotectednetwork without violating the tenants of a “zone and conduit” model ofcyber-security, meaning there is no direct network connection betweenthe protected and unprotected networks. One example of configurationparameters that might be passed to the SMX agents 103 on the protectedsystem nodes 102 a-102 n includes whitelists and blacklists of files,file types, or media types that the SMX agents 103 will or will notgrant access to, bypassing normal protective behaviors.

Note that the SMX servers 105 can use a variety of malware detectionmethods or work in conjunction with a variety of malware detectionsoftware packages. Also note that the SMX servers 105 could receiveadministrator input to control how the SMX servers 105 decide whichfiles, file types, or media types are authorized for use within aprotected system. In general, any suitable techniques could be used foridentifying files, file types, or media types to which the SMX agents103 allow access.

In this example, multiple networks 106 a-106 b are present in the system100. The network 106 a supports communications between the protectedsystem nodes 102 a-102 n, while the network 106 b supportscommunications to and from the SMX kiosks 104. The use of differentnetworks 106 a-106 b here allows the SMX kiosks 104 to reside outside ofa protected system (formed by at least the protected system nodes 102a-102 n and the network 106 a). However, the protected system nodes 102a-102 n and the SMX kiosks 104 could alternatively communicate over thesame network(s). Each network 106 a-106 b includes any suitable networkor combination of networks.

The system 100 also optionally includes at least one security manager108 and at least one database 110 used by or otherwise associated withthe security manager(s) 108. Each security manager 108 denotes a systemsupporting the analysis of cyber-security data from information sourcessuch as the SMX agents 103 or the SMX servers 105. For example, asecurity manager 108 could analyze threat intelligence data and auditlogs generated and supported by the SMX agents 103 or other sourcesconnected to the network 106 a. Note that each security manager 108could be connected to the network 106 a or to the network 106 b but notboth, since the network 106 a may need to remain isolated from thenetwork 106 b. The data from the SMX agents 103 could be obtaineddirectly from the SMX agents 103 or indirectly, such as via storagedevices that physically transport data from the SMX servers 105 or othercomponents coupled to the network 106 b into the network 106 a. Theability to transport data to the security manager 108 indirectly mayallow a wide range of data to be securely provided into a protectednetwork.

The security manager 108 analyzes the collected data (possibly includingdata from an unprotected network that might otherwise be unobtainable)to generate indicators identifying various cyber-security threats in thesystem 100. The collected threat intelligence data, audit logs, or otherinformation could be stored in the database 110. Each security manager108 includes any suitable structure used for analyzing cybersecurity-related data, such as threat data, vulnerability data, networkstatistics, diagnostics, maintenance information, and performance data.As a particular example, each security manager 108 could denote aHONEYWELL RISK MANAGER. Each database 110 includes any suitablestructure for storing and retrieving data.

The system 100 further optionally includes at least one threat analysisserver 112 and at least one database 114 used by or otherwise associatedwith the threat analysis server(s) 112. Each threat analysis server 112denotes a system supporting the analysis of data to identify threatsassociated with the system 100. For example, a threat analysis server112 could denote a cloud-based or other computing platform that supportssandboxing, code analysis, reputation analysis, and behavioral analysisin order to identify new forms of malware. When an SMX server 105 isunable to determine whether code on a storage device includes malware,the SMX server 105 could provide the code to the threat analysis server112 for evaluation. If a user or the threat analysis server 112determines that the code is malicious, the threat analysis server 112can update the SMX servers 105 with new threat information. The threatanalysis server 112 could also obtain information identifying newcyber-security threats (such as new malware signatures) from othersources and provide the threat information to the SMX servers 105. Thethreat analysis server 112 could further obtain information definingcyber-security threats identified by some of the SMX servers 105 andprovide that information to others of the SMX servers 105. As a result,the overall system can “learn” about new threats over time and adaptaccordingly. Ideally, the SMX servers 105 are updated over time toaccumulate intelligence regarding both known and unknown (zero-day)attacks.

The database 114 is used to store various information aboutcyber-security threats or other aspects of the system 100. For example,the database 114 could be used to store information about knowncyber-security attacks, industries and systems currently targeted bycyber-security attacks, and indicators that a device or system has beencompromised. The database 114 could also be used to store informationabout threat patterns and advanced threat campaigns. The database 114could further be used to store audit logs or other information collectedfrom the SMX kiosks 104. Each database 114 includes any suitablestructure for storing and retrieving data.

Note that while the threat analysis server 112 and database 114 areshown here as forming part of the system, these components could resideoutside of and be used in conjunction with the system 100. This mayallow operations of the threat analysis server 112 to be provided as aservice to a number of users in the same organization or in multipleorganizations. As a particular example, the threat analysis server 112could be used to generate detailed threat reports as a service to theoperator of the system 100 and to operators of other protected systems.

Additional details regarding the operations of the SMX agents 103 andthe SMX servers 105 are provided below. The SMX agents 103 and the SMXservers 105 could be used in any suitable system where at least oneprotected system node 102 a-102 n exists. As noted above, these caninclude industrial control systems, manufacturing plants or otherfacilities, hospitals or other healthcare facilities, and classifiednetwork areas.

Although FIG. 1 illustrates one example of a system 100 supportingsecure data transfer using removable media, various changes may be madeto FIG. 1. For example, the system 100 could include any number ofprotected system nodes, SMX kiosks, networks, security managers, threatanalysis servers, databases, and other components.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example industrial process control and automationsystem 200 in which removable media could be used according to thisdisclosure. The control and automation system 200 denotes one exampletype of system where the SMX agents 103 and the SMX servers 105described above could be implemented.

As shown in FIG. 2, the system 200 includes various components thatfacilitate production or processing of at least one product or othermaterial. For instance, the system 200 is used here to facilitatecontrol over components in one or multiple plants 201 a-201 n. Eachplant 201 a-201 n represents one or more processing facilities (or oneor more portions thereof), such as one or more manufacturing facilitiesfor producing at least one product or other material. In general, eachplant 201 a-201 n may implement one or more processes and canindividually or collectively be referred to as a process system. Aprocess system generally represents any system or portion thereofconfigured to process one or more products or other materials in somemanner.

In FIG. 2, the system 200 is implemented using the Purdue model ofprocess control. In the Purdue model, “Level 0” may include one or moresensors 202 a and one or more actuators 202 b. The sensors 202 a andactuators 202 b represent components in a process system that mayperform any of a wide variety of functions. For example, the sensors 202a could measure a wide variety of characteristics in the process system,such as temperature, pressure, or flow rate. Also, the actuators 202 bcould alter a wide variety of characteristics in the process system. Thesensors 202 a and actuators 202 b could represent any other oradditional components in any suitable process system. Each of thesensors 202 a includes any suitable structure for measuring one or morecharacteristics in a process system. Each of the actuators 202 bincludes any suitable structure for operating on or affecting one ormore conditions in a process system.

One or more networks 204 are coupled to the sensors 202 a and actuators202 b. The network 204 facilitates interaction with the sensors 202 aand actuators 202 b. For example, the network 204 could transportmeasurement data from the sensors 202 a and provide control signals tothe actuators 202 b. The network 204 could represent any suitablenetwork or combination of networks. As particular examples, the network204 could represent an Ethernet network, an electrical signal network(such as a HART or FOUNDATION FIELDBUS network), a pneumatic controlsignal network, or any other or additional type(s) of network(s).

In the Purdue model, “Level 1” includes one or more controllers 206,which are coupled to the network 204. Among other things, eachcontroller 206 may use the measurements from one or more sensors 202 ato control the operation of one or more actuators 202 b. Each controller206 includes any suitable structure for controlling one or more aspectsof a process system. As a particular example, each controller 206 couldrepresent a computing device running a real-time operating system.

Redundant networks 208 are coupled to the controllers 206. The networks208 facilitate interaction with the controllers 206, such as bytransporting data to and from the controllers 206. The networks 208could represent any suitable redundant networks. As particular examples,the networks 208 could represent a pair of Ethernet networks or aredundant pair of Ethernet networks, such as a FAULT TOLERANT ETHERNET(FTE) network from HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.

At least one switch/firewall 210 couples the networks 208 to twonetworks 212. The switch/firewall 210 may transport traffic from onenetwork to another network. The switch/firewall 210 may also blocktraffic on one network from reaching another network. Theswitch/firewall 210 includes any suitable structure for providingcommunication between networks, such as a HONEYWELL CONTROL FIREWALL(CF9) device. The networks 212 could represent any suitable networks,such as a pair of Ethernet networks or an FTE network.

In the Purdue model, “Level 2” may include one or more machine-levelcontrollers 214 coupled to the networks 212. The machine-levelcontrollers 214 perform various functions to support the operation andcontrol of the controllers 206, sensors 202 a, and actuators 202 b,which could be associated with a particular piece of industrialequipment (such as a boiler or other machine). For example, themachine-level controllers 214 could log information collected orgenerated by the controllers 206, such as measurement data from thesensors 202 a or control signals for the actuators 202 b. Themachine-level controllers 214 could also execute applications thatcontrol the operation of the controllers 206, thereby controlling theoperation of the actuators 202 b. In addition, the machine-levelcontrollers 214 could provide secure access to the controllers 206. Eachof the machine-level controllers 214 includes any suitable structure forproviding access to, control of, or operations related to a machine orother individual piece of equipment. Each of the machine-levelcontrollers 214 could, for example, represent a server computing devicerunning a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system. Although not shown,different machine-level controllers 214 could be used to controldifferent pieces of equipment in a process system (where each piece ofequipment is associated with one or more controllers 206, sensors 202 a,and actuators 202 b).

One or more operator stations 216 are coupled to the networks 212. Theoperator stations 216 represent computing or communication devicesproviding user access to the machine-level controllers 214, which couldthen provide user access to the controllers 206 (and possibly thesensors 202 a and actuators 202 b). As particular examples, the operatorstations 216 could allow users to review the operational history of thesensors 202 a and actuators 202 b using information collected by thecontrollers 206 and/or the machine-level controllers 214. The operatorstations 216 could also allow the users to adjust the operation of thesensors 202 a, actuators 202 b, controllers 206, or machine-levelcontrollers 214. In addition, the operator stations 216 could receiveand display warnings, alerts, or other messages or displays generated bythe controllers 206 or the machine-level controllers 214. Each of theoperator stations 216 includes any suitable structure for supportinguser access and control of one or more components in the system 200.Each of the operator stations 216 could, for example, represent acomputing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

At least one router/firewall 218 couples the networks 212 to twonetworks 220. The router/firewall 218 includes any suitable structurefor providing communication between networks, such as a secure router orcombination router/firewall. The networks 220 could represent anysuitable networks, such as a pair of Ethernet networks or an FTEnetwork.

In the Purdue model, “Level 3” may include one or more unit-levelcontrollers 222 coupled to the networks 220. Each unit-level controller222 is typically associated with a unit in a process system, whichrepresents a collection of different machines operating together toimplement at least part of a process. The unit-level controllers 222perform various functions to support the operation and control ofcomponents in the lower levels. For example, the unit-level controllers222 could log information collected or generated by the components inthe lower levels, execute applications that control the components inthe lower levels, and provide secure access to the components in thelower levels. Each of the unit-level controllers 222 includes anysuitable structure for providing access to, control of, or operationsrelated to one or more machines or other pieces of equipment in aprocess unit. Each of the unit-level controllers 222 could, for example,represent a server computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWSoperating system. Although not shown, different unit-level controllers222 could be used to control different units in a process system (whereeach unit is associated with one or more machine-level controllers 214,controllers 206, sensors 202 a, and actuators 202 b).

Access to the unit-level controllers 222 may be provided by one or moreoperator stations 224. Each of the operator stations 224 includes anysuitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or morecomponents in the system 200. Each of the operator stations 224 could,for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWSoperating system.

At least one router/firewall 226 couples the networks 220 to twonetworks 228. The router/firewall 226 includes any suitable structurefor providing communication between networks, such as a secure router orcombination router/firewall. The networks 228 could represent anysuitable networks, such as a pair of Ethernet networks or an FTEnetwork.

In the Purdue model, “Level 4” may include one or more plant-levelcontrollers 230 coupled to the networks 228. Each plant-level controller230 is typically associated with one of the plants 201 a-201 n, whichmay include one or more process units that implement the same, similar,or different processes. The plant-level controllers 230 perform variousfunctions to support the operation and control of components in thelower levels. As particular examples, the plant-level controller 230could execute one or more manufacturing execution system (MES)applications, scheduling applications, or other or additional plant orprocess control applications. Each of the plant-level controllers 230includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, oroperations related to one or more process units in a process plant. Eachof the plant-level controllers 230 could, for example, represent aserver computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

Access to the plant-level controllers 230 may be provided by one or moreoperator stations 232. Each of the operator stations 232 includes anysuitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or morecomponents in the system 200. Each of the operator stations 232 could,for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWSoperating system.

At least one router/firewall 234 couples the networks 228 to one or morenetworks 236. The router/firewall 234 includes any suitable structurefor providing communication between networks, such as a secure router orcombination router/firewall. The network 236 could represent anysuitable network, such as an enterprise-wide Ethernet or other networkor all or a portion of a larger network (such as the Internet).

In the Purdue model, “Level 5” may include one or more enterprise-levelcontrollers 238 coupled to the network 236. Each enterprise-levelcontroller 238 is typically able to perform planning operations formultiple plants 201 a-201 n and to control various aspects of the plants201 a-201 n. The enterprise-level controllers 238 can also performvarious functions to support the operation and control of components inthe plants 201 a-201 n. As particular examples, the enterprise-levelcontroller 238 could execute one or more order processing applications,enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications, advanced planning andscheduling (APS) applications, or any other or additional enterprisecontrol applications. Each of the enterprise-level controllers 238includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, oroperations related to the control of one or more plants. Each of theenterprise-level controllers 238 could, for example, represent a servercomputing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system. In thisdocument, the term “enterprise” refers to an organization having one ormore plants or other processing facilities to be managed. Note that if asingle plant 201 a is to be managed, the functionality of theenterprise-level controller 238 could be incorporated into theplant-level controller 230.

Access to the enterprise-level controllers 238 may be provided by one ormore operator stations 240. Each of the operator stations 240 includesany suitable structure for supporting user access and control of one ormore components in the system 200. Each of the operator stations 240could, for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFTWINDOWS operating system.

A historian 242 is also coupled to the network 236 in this example. Thehistorian 242 could represent a component that stores variousinformation about the system 200. The historian 242 could, for example,store information used during production scheduling and optimization.The historian 242 represents any suitable structure for storing andfacilitating retrieval of information. Although shown as a singlecentralized component coupled to the network 236, the historian 242could be located elsewhere in the system 200, or multiple historianscould be distributed in different locations in the system 200.

In some embodiments, various components in or below “Level 3” in thesystem 200 could denote protected system nodes that execute the SMXagents 103 described above. Also, one or more SMX servers 105 could beimplemented in the system 200, such as at “Level 4” or higher in thesystem 200. As a result, the use of removable media with thosecomponents could be restricted as described above. Through the use ofthe SMX agents 103 and the SMX servers 105, industrial control system or“ICS” attacks initiated through the use of removable media could besignificantly reduced. In particular embodiments, various components inthe system 200 could denote ICS cyber-security-specific monitoring andanalytics systems, such as HONEYWELL RISK MANAGER, which might interactwith SMX agents 103 to detect potential risk indicators leading to acyber-security threat.

Although FIG. 2 illustrates one example of an industrial process controland automation system 200 in which removable media could be used,various changes may be made to FIG. 2. For example, industrial controland automation systems come in a wide variety of configurations. Thesystem 200 shown in FIG. 2 is meant to illustrate one exampleoperational environment in which certain functionalities can be used.However, FIG. 2 does not limit this disclosure to any particularconfiguration or operational environment.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example device 300 supporting secure data transferusing removable media according to this disclosure. For example, thedevice 300 shown in FIG. 3 could denote any of the protected systemnodes 102 a-102 n or any of the SMX kiosks 104 described above withrespect to the system 100 of FIG. 1. The device 300 shown in FIG. 3could also denote any of the protected devices described above withrespect to the system 200 of FIG. 2.

As shown in FIG. 3, the device 300 includes at least one processor 302,at least one storage device 304, at least one communications unit 306,at least one input/output (I/O) unit 308, and at least one removablemedia interface 310. Each processor 302 can execute instructions, suchas those that may be loaded into a memory 312. Each processor 302denotes any suitable processing device, such as one or moremicroprocessors, microcontrollers, digital signal processors,application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmablegate arrays (FPGAs), or discrete circuitry.

The memory 312 and a persistent storage 314 are examples of storagedevices 304, which represent any structure(s) capable of storing andfacilitating retrieval of information (such as data, program code,and/or other suitable information on a temporary or permanent basis).The memory 312 may represent a random access memory or any othersuitable volatile or non-volatile storage device(s). The persistentstorage 314 may contain one or more components or devices supportinglonger-term storage of data, such as a read only memory, hard drive,Flash memory, or optical disc.

The communications unit 306 supports communications with other systemsor devices. For example, the communications unit 306 could include anetwork interface card or a wireless transceiver facilitatingcommunications over a wired or wireless network (such as the network 106b). The communications unit 306 may support communications through anysuitable physical or wireless communication link(s).

The I/O unit 308 allows for input and output of data. For example, theI/O unit 308 may provide a connection for user input through a keyboard,mouse, keypad, touchscreen, or other suitable input device. The I/O unit308 may also send output to a display, printer, or other suitable outputdevice.

Each removable media interface 310 denotes a structure to which astorage device can be coupled. For example, the device 300 could includeone or more USB slots, Secure Digital High Capacity (SDHC) or otherFlash memory slots, or other interfaces for coupling to storage devices.Depending on the implementation, the device 300 could include a singleremovable media interface 310 or multiple removable media interfaces 310of the same type or of different types.

When the device 300 implements an SMX kiosk 104, the processor(s) 302can execute instructions implementing the SMX server 105. For example,when a storage device is inserted into or otherwise coupled to aremovable media interface 310, the processor(s) 302 could executeinstructions for checking-in or checking-out the storage device. Theprocessor(s) 302 could also execute instructions for interacting with asecurity manager 108, threat analysis server 112, or other externalsystem.

When the device 300 implements a protected system node 102 a-102 n orother protected device, the processor(s) 302 can execute instructionsimplementing the SMX agent 103. For example, when a storage device isinserted into or otherwise coupled to a removable media interface 310,the processor(s) 302 could execute instructions for determining whetherthe storage device has been checked-in. If so, the processor(s) 302could execute instructions allowing the storage device to be accessedand used. If not, the processor(s) 302 could execute instructionsblocking use of the storage device.

Although FIG. 3 illustrates one example of a device 300 supportingsecure data transfer using removable media, various changes may be madeto FIG. 3. For example, various components in FIG. 3 could be combined,further subdivided, or omitted and additional components could be addedaccording to particular needs. Also, computing devices can come in awide variety of configurations, and FIG. 3 does not limit thisdisclosure to any particular configuration of computing device.

FIGS. 4 through 7B illustrate examples of handling removable media tosupport secure data transfer into and out of protected systems accordingto this disclosure. For ease of explanation, the processes shown inFIGS. 4 through 7B are described with respect to the system 100 ofFIG. 1. However, the processes shown in FIGS. 4 through 7B could be usedin any other suitable system, such as the system 200 of FIG. 2.

As shown in FIG. 4, a storage device 402 is inserted into a slot of orotherwise coupled to an SMX kiosk 104, and a check-in process can beselected on a display of the SMX kiosk 104 (or using another inputmechanism). The SMX server 105 of the SMX kiosk 104 then performs thecheck-in procedure. The check-in procedure could include functions suchas scanning the storage device 402 for malware, digitally signing andpossibly encrypting clean files on the storage device 402, andquarantining any files identified as having malware on the storagedevice 402 (where the quarantined files are not signed or encrypted).The check-in procedure could also include functions such as authorizingthe storage device 402 for connectivity (such as by digitally signingthe storage device 402 itself) and locking the file system of thestorage device 402 so that only SMX agents 103 can access the storagedevice 402 (to prevent use outside of a protected system). The check-inprocedure could further include functions such as creating a filemanifest to contain scan results, activity logs, messages, and otherinformation relevant to the operation of the system 100.

The check-in procedure could also optionally include adding one or moreconfiguration parameters or other data to the storage device 402, suchas within the file manifest. This data can be stored in an encrypted andsigned configuration file or other file. The configuration parameters orother data can be used to update SMX agents 103 as described below. Inaddition, the results of the malware scan, a timestamp, an active user,configuration options, or other information can be stored on the storagedevice 402 in an encrypted and signed auditing file (called an auditlog), and the audit log could be reported to a security manager 108 orthreat analysis server 112.

Note that the scanning of files and the determination of which files areconsidered “clean” could be done in any suitable manner, such as byusing a third-party anti-virus or anti-malware software package,pre-defined configuration files, or manual configurations. Moreover, thescanning and determination could include not only scanning the files onthe storage device 402 but also identifying the type of storage device402 itself and determining whether the storage device 402 is an allowedtype of peripheral device. Further, the storage device 402 itself andindividual files on the storage device 402 could be signed in anysuitable manner. For instance, an SMX server 105 could digitally signthe storage device 402 itself by storing a hash on the storage device402, and the SMX server 105 could digitally sign each file by storing ahash for each file on the storage device 402, potentially within thefile manifest. Strong hash generation algorithms could be used in orderto prevent reverse engineering or “cracking” of hash signatures. Filesthat are not authorized are not signed, such as when there is no hashprovided for that file. In addition, the file system of the storagedevice 402 could be locked in any suitable manner, such as by alteringkey components of the file system using any suitable encryption methodand a locally-stored certificate or private key.

As shown in FIGS. 5A and 5B, a “checked-in” storage device 402 can beused with a protected system node 102. For example, the SMX agent 103 onthe protected system node 102 could be configured with the appropriatesecurity certificate(s) and parameter(s) that allow the SMX agent 103 tovalidate signed storage devices and files, possibly decrypt encryptedfiles, access a storage device's altered file system, read encryptedconfiguration parameters or other data if present, and read and write toone or more encrypted audit logs if present. Data can be transferredhere from the storage device 402 onto the protected node 102 and/or fromthe protected node 102 onto the storage device 402.

In some embodiments, an SMX agent 103 can operate as a kernel-leveldriver or in kernel mode so that the SMX agent 103 allows access to aprotected node's file system only upon validation and possiblydecryption of certain files or elements. The SMX agent 103 couldtherefore intercept attempts to connect a storage device 402 at thedriver level. The SMX agent 103 intercepts a connection attempt and(among other things) checks the signature or file system of the storagedevice 402. If the storage device 402 is allowed (checked-in), it hasbeen digitally signed, utilizes a modified file system structure, andmay include a compatible file manifest. An SMX agent 103 is able to readthe file systems of storage devices 402 that are checked-in by SMXservers 105, and the SMX agent 103 is able to validate the digitalsignatures of authorized storage devices 402 (such as by using a sharedcertificate or private key).

Once a storage device 402 is validated, the SMX agent 103 analyzes eachfile against a unique digital signature (such as a hash) that isprovided for that file by the SMX server 105, which is validated using ashared certificate or private key. If the storage device 402 and a fileare successfully validated, the file is freely accessible by the localfile system of the protected node 102 (so it can be copied from theremovable storage device 402 to the local file system). If the storagedevice 402 or a file is not successfully validated, the storage device402 or the file is blocked by the SMX agent 103 and not made accessiblefor any meaningful access to the local file system of the protected node102. During this time, the audit log(s) on the storage device 402 can beupdated by the SMX agent 103 to identify the user and the types ofoperations attempted or performed using the storage device 402. Notethat “meaningful” access here includes read, write, or delete access fora stream, file, directory, or volume (which can be prevented when thedevice 402 is not checked-in). Other functions could still be allowedwhen the device 402 is not checked-in, such as those that may berequired by an operating system or those with little or no risk (such asquerying or changing standard attributes, performing directoryenumerations, or accessing USB power systems for device charging).

This helps to prevent unauthorized storage devices and files from beingused in a system. Files from a storage device 402 can be copied onto aprotected system node 102 and files from the protected system node 102can be copied onto the storage device 402 only after the storage device402 has been checked-in and examined.

As shown in FIG. 6, the storage device 402 is inserted into a slot of orotherwise coupled to an SMX kiosk 104, and a check-out process can beselected on a display of the SMX kiosk 104 (or using another inputmechanism). The SMX server 105 of the SMX kiosk 104 then performs thecheck-out procedure. The check-out procedure could include functionssuch as scanning the storage device 402 for malware in any new files (tostop outbound infection) and unlocking the file system of the storagedevice 402 so the storage device 402 can be used outside a protectedsystem. The check-out procedure could also include functions such asdeauthorizing the storage device 402 for connectivity and copying andremoving all digital signatures, configuration parameters, log files, orfile manifests on the storage device 402.

A checked-out storage device 402 has reverted to its original state,meaning digital signatures have been removed, encrypted elements havebeen decrypted, the normal file system operation has been restored, andconfiguration files have been removed. Audit log files on the storagedevice 402 can be collected by the SMX server 105 during the check-outprocess and then removed from the storage device 402. Note that any newfiles copied onto the storage device 402 while checked-in may or may notremain on the storage device 402 depending on the configuration of thesystem.

Because an SMX agent 103 can operate in kernel mode on a protected node102, the SMX agent 103 can be aware of all files copied to or from astorage device 402. The SMX agent 103 can also be aware of all fileactivity that is blocked, such as due to the presence of unauthorizedfiles (like malware) or attempts to save files from a protected node 102onto the storage device 402. The SMX agent 103 can similarly be awarewhen an unauthorized storage device is connected to a protected node102, and the attempt can be logged in a local encrypted log file on theprotected node 102.

The SMX agent 103 can save information related to all of these events orother events in an audit log file on an authorized storage device 402.For example, when an authorized storage device 402 is connected to aprotected node 102, any or all available log files stored locally on theprotected node 102 could be copied to the authorized storage device 402.If a file is copied from the authorized storage device 402 to theprotected node 102, the SMX agent 103 can append details of the fileactivity to the log file on the storage device 402. If a file is copiedto the storage device 402 from the protected node 102, the SMX agent 103can again append details of the file activity to the log file on thestorage device 402. If an attempted file transfer to or from the storagedevice 402 is blocked by the SMX agent 103, the SMX agent 103 can appenddetails of the file activity to the log file on the storage device 402.

Any suitable information could be included in an audit log file, eitheron a protected node 102 or on a storage device 402. Example details thatmay be included in the audit log file for a file activity could includea source node or device identifier, a target node or device identifier,parameters of the source and target nodes like Internet Protocol (IP)address and Medium Access Control (MAC) address, file name, file size,file type, file permissions, active user, and whether the file activitywas allowed, blocked, or successful. Note, however, that any other oradditional information could be stored in an audit log file as needed ordesired. The audit log file can be encrypted, such as by using acertificate or locally-stored private key.

When a storage device 402 with an audit log file connects to an SMXserver 105 (such as for check-out), the SMX server 105 can copy theaudit log file from the storage device 402 (such as to a local log storeon the SMX server 105). The file can be decrypted, such as by using alocally-stored certificate or private key, and made accessible to theSMX server 105 or other tool. Audit logs could be used in various ways,such as by generating audit reports or passing audit information toother systems like a security manager 108 or threat analysis server 112.

Support for the use of audit logs on storage devices 402 allows, amongother things, the overall system to track which files are introduced towhich protected nodes within a protected system via removable media. Thedetails contained in an audit log could include pertinent details offile input/output (I/O), such as the active user, date, time, sourcefile, and target system information related to a file transfer.Conventional local file system logs available on a target node typicallylack information about file authorization or integrity and areunavailable to management or monitoring systems that reside outside of aprotected system. Since audit logs on storage devices 402 can beretrieved and forwarded by SMX servers 105, the SMX agents 103 and theSMX servers 105 can collect a large amount of information useful formore effective auditing of the use of removable media in a protectedsystem.

As shown in FIG. 7A, a storage device 402 cannot be used with anunprotected node 702 (a node that lacks an SMX agent 103) outside aprotected system while the storage device 402 is checked-in. Forexample, the storage device 402 could be unrecognizable to a computingsystem that does not understand the file system modification that hasoccurred and that does not possess the necessary private key to decryptthe file system elements so that the file system is again fullyfunctional. As a result, if a checked-in storage device 402 is connectedto an unprotected node 702, the storage device 402 may be seen asunreadable and will not mount, and a user could be prompted to formatthe storage device 402 to make it usable. If this action is taken, allfiles on the storage device 402 would be destroyed, so an optionalconfiguration parameter may allow an SMX server 105 to create anencrypted backup of a storage device's contents at the time of check-inso as to provide a recovery mechanism should this occur. For instance,the recovery mechanism could allow the SMX server 105 to restore thebacked-up contents to the storage device 402.

Conversely, as shown in FIG. 7B, the storage device 402 cannot be usedwith a protected system node 102 within a protected system if thestorage device 402 is not checked-in. In some embodiments, theprotection provided to the protected system node 102 by an SMX agent 103is enforced at the kernel-level.

If a virus or other malware is introduced onto a storage device 402, thefile containing the malware is not signed by the SMX server 105. Theprotected system node 102 is unable to access that file, hindering thefunctionality of the malware. If an attempt is made to attach achecked-in storage device 402 to an untrusted node in order to addmalware after the storage device 402 has been scanned by the SMX server105, the attempt fails due to the modifications to the storage device'sfile system. If an attempt is made to copy files from a protected systemnode 102 (where an SMX agent 103 is installed), the file copy may beallowed or denied by the driver depending upon the SMX agent'sconfiguration, and the activity is written to the audit log(s) so thatfile exfiltration attempts can be prevented or managed.

Note that in some embodiments, the controls displayed by the SMX kiosk104 could be disabled until a storage device 402 is inserted orotherwise coupled to the kiosk 104. Once attached, the SMX server 105could determine whether the storage device 402 has already beenchecked-in. If not, the “check-in” option can be enabled, while the“check-out” option can be disabled. If so, the “check out” option can beenabled, while the “check-in” option can be disabled. Additional userinterface controls could be accessible using a privileged oradministrative mode of the kiosk SMX 104.

Although FIGS. 4 through 7B illustrate examples of handling removablemedia to support secure data transfer into and out of protected systems,various changes may be made to FIGS. 4 through 7B. For example, anysuitable input mechanisms could be used with the SMX kiosks 104. Also,while the storage device 402 is shown here as a USB drive, any othersuitable storage devices could be used. In addition, the form factors ofthe kiosk and nodes are for illustration only.

FIGS. 8 through 11 illustrate example methods supporting secure datatransfer into and out of protected systems using removable mediaaccording to this disclosure. For ease of explanation, the methods shownin FIGS. 8 through 11 are described with respect to the system 100 ofFIG. 1. However, the methods shown in FIGS. 8 through 11 could be usedin any other suitable system, such as the system 200 of FIG. 2.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example method 800 supporting a check-in processfor removable media. The method 800 could, for example, be performed bythe SMX server 105 executing on the processor 302 of the SMX kiosk 104.The check-in process allows the removable media to be used in aprotected environment, such as an environment where protected nodes 102a-102 n execute SMX agents 103.

As shown in FIG. 8, an untrusted storage device is detected at step 802.This could include, for example, the SMX server 105 detecting insertionor coupling of the storage device 402 in or to the removable mediainterface 310 of the SMX kiosk 104. This could also include the SMXserver 105 examining the storage device 402 and determining that thestorage device 402 lacks the contents of a checked-in device (such as aspecified digital signature or a modified file system). The storagedevice 402 could denote any suitable device for storing data, such as aUSB device, an SDHC or other Flash memory device, or other portablestorage device.

A scan of the untrusted storage device occurs at step 804. This couldinclude, for example, the SMX server 105 initiating an anti-virus oranti-malware scan of the storage device 402. The SMX server 105 coulduse a variety of anti-virus or anti-malware software packages,pre-defined configuration files, or manual configurations to determinewhich files are clean.

A determination is made whether any malware has been detected at step806. For any file determined to be clean (lacking any malware), theclean file is digitally signed and possibly encrypted at step 808. Thiscould include, for example, the SMX server 105 calculating a hash ofeach clean file and possibly using an encryption key known to the SMXagents 103 to encrypt each clean file. For any file determined to beinfected (containing malware), the infected file is quarantined and theevent is logged at step 810. This could include, for example, the SMXserver 105 using an anti-virus or anti-malware tool to quarantine eachinfected file. This could also include the SMX server 105 updating a logfile on the SMX kiosk 104 or on the storage device 402 to identify themalware or infected file. Any infected file is not digitally signed orencrypted.

For any “unknown” file (where a determination cannot be made that thefile is clean or definitely contains malware), the file is sent to anexternal destination for analysis at step 812. This could include, forexample, the SMX server 105 providing the file to the security manager108 or threat analysis server 112 for analysis. As a particular example,this could include the SMX server 105 providing the file to the threatanalysis server 112 for sandboxing, code analysis, reputation analysis,and behavioral analysis. Ideally, the security manager 108 or threatanalysis server 112 returns an indication that the file does or does notcontain malware, and the SMX server 105 performs step 808 or 810 forthat file depending on the determination by the security manager 108 orthreat analysis server 112. This could also include a localadministrator of the SMX server 105 manually authorizing a device orfile that would otherwise not be authorized by the SMX server 105 andtherefore would be blocked by the SMX agents 103 (the administrativeoverride can be logged to the audit log of the storage device 402).

Note that only the clean files are signed and possibly encrypted here,so only those files known to be clean will be accessible by the SMXagents 103. For any unknown files, the SMX server 105 can obtaininformation from an external source in deciding whether the filescontain malware. In some embodiments, if a definitive determinationcannot be made that a file is clean, the file may not be signed orencrypted in order to protect the nodes of a protected system. However,other approaches could also be used.

One or more hidden files are stored on the storage device at step 814.This could include, for example, the SMX server 105 storing one or moreaudit log files, one or more configurations, or one or more event logson the storage device 402, such as in a file manifest. The file systemof the storage device is locked at step 816. This could include, forexample, the SMX server 105 modifying the file system of the storagedevice 402 in a manner recognizable by the SMX agents 103 but not byunprotected nodes. The file system of the storage device 402 could belocked in any suitable manner, such as by altering key components of thefile system using a certificate or private key. The device itself can besigned at step 818. This could include, for example, the SMX server 105digitally signing the storage device 402 itself, such as by storing ahash on the storage device 402.

At this point, removal of the storage device (now a trusted device) isallowed at step 820. This could include, for example, the SMX server 105notifying a user that the storage device 402 has been checked-in and canbe safely removed from the removable media interface 310 of the SMXkiosk 104. The trusted device can now be used with one or more protectednodes 102 a-102 n, and contents of the trusted device cannot be used byuntrusted nodes. Thus, for instance, malware could not intentionally orunintentionally be placed onto the storage device 402 by an unprotectednode 702 while the storage device 402 is checked-in.

Note that this represents one example procedure for checking-in astorage device and that additional operations could occur during themethod 800 as needed or desired. For example, as noted above, onlycertain types of storage devices may be allowed in a protected system.In some embodiments, the SMX server 105 could determine the type of thestorage device 402, such as before scanning the storage device 402 formalware. In these types of embodiments, the malware scan could beperformed or the device itself could be signed only if the storagedevice 402 is an allowable type of device. As another example, a usercould be given the option of creating an encrypted or other backup copyof the contents of the storage device 402 during check-in. The backupcould be used later to restore the storage device 402 if the userinadvertently allows an unprotected node to format the storage device402. The backup could be stored until the storage device 402 is checkedout or for any other length of time.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example method 900 supporting a check-out processfor removable media. The method 900 could, for example, be performed bythe SMX server 105 executing on the processor 302 of the SMX kiosk 104.The check-out process allows the removable media to be used in anunprotected environment, such as an environment where nodes are notprotected by SMX agents 103. The checked-out removable media cannot beused in a protected environment.

As shown in FIG. 9, a trusted storage device is detected at step 902.This could include, for example, the SMX server 105 detecting insertionor coupling of the storage device 402 in or to the removable mediainterface 310 of the SMX kiosk 104. This could also include the SMXserver 105 examining the storage device 402 and determining that thestorage device 402 contains the contents of a checked-in device (such asa specified digital signature or a modified file system).

A scan of the trusted storage device occurs at step 904. This couldinclude, for example, the SMX server 105 initiating an anti-virus oranti-malware scan for any new files added to the storage device 402since the storage device was checked-in. The SMX server 105 could alsoperform an anti-virus or anti-malware scan for previously-existing fileson the storage device 402, such as those that were modified since thestorage device was checked-in or all files on the storage device 402.The SMX server 105 could use a variety of anti-virus or anti-malwaresoftware packages, pre-defined configuration files, or manualconfigurations to determine which files are clean.

A determination is made whether any malware has been detected at step906. For any newly-added file or other file determined to be clean(lacking any malware), the clean file could optionally be decrypted (ifencrypted) at step 908. For any newly-added file or other filedetermined to be infected (containing malware), the infected file isquarantined and the event is logged at step 910. In some embodiments,the infected file may be deleted or not be decrypted so as to stopoutbound infection of unprotected nodes via the storage device 402. Forany “unknown” newly-added file or other file (where a determinationcannot be made that the file is clean or definitely contains malware),the file is sent to an external destination for analysis at step 912.

One or more hidden files are copied from the storage device at step 914.This could include, for example, the SMX server 105 retrieving one ormore file hashes, one or more audit log files, one or moreconfigurations, and one or more event logs from the storage device 402and storing the data on the SMX kiosk 104. The data could also be madeavailable to the security manager 108 or threat analysis server 112 orother component for archiving or analysis. Various contents are removedfrom the storage device at step 916. This could include, for example,the SMX server 105 deleting digital signatures, log files,configurations, and event logs from the storage device 402.

The file system of the storage device is unlocked at step 918. Thiscould include, for example, the SMX server 105 modifying the file systemof the storage device 402 in a manner recognizable by unprotected nodesbut not by the SMX agents 103. For instance, the SMX server 105 couldreturn the file system of a USB drive or Flash memory device to astandardized file system format so that conventional computing devices(but not protected nodes) could access and use the USB drive or Flashmemory device.

At this point, removal of the storage device (now an untrusted device)is allowed at step 920. This could include, for example, the SMX server105 notifying a user that the storage device 402 has been checked-outand can be safely removed from the removable media interface 310 of theSMX kiosk 104. The untrusted device can no longer be used with one ormore protected nodes 102 a-102 n, and contents of the untrusted devicecannot be accessed by the protected nodes 102 a-102 n.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example method 1000 supporting use of removablemedia at a protected node. The method 1000 could, for example, beperformed by the SMX agent 103 executing on the processor 302 of aprotected system node 102. This process supports the use of checked-inremovable media in a protected environment.

As shown in FIG. 10, a storage device is detected at step 1002. Thiscould include, for example, the SMX server 105 detecting insertion orcoupling of the storage device 402 in or to the removable mediainterface 310 of a protected system node 102. A status of the storagedevice is determined at step 1004. This could include, for example, theSMX agent 103 examining the storage device 402 and determining whetherthe storage device 402 contains the contents of a checked-in device(such as a specified digital signature or a modified file system). Thiscould also include the SMX agent 103 determining whether the storagedevice 402 is whitelisted or blacklisted. An explanation of whitelistingand blacklisting of storage devices is provided below.

A determination is made whether the storage device is untrusted (notchecked-in) or blacklisted at step 1006. Blacklisting may be desired,for instance, to prevent certain devices or types of devices from beingused even if checked-in by an SMX server 105. If so, access to thestorage device is blocked and the event is logged at step 1010, and themethod 1000 ends. In this case, the SMX agent 103 prevents the storagedevice 402 from being used by the protected system node 102, helping toprotect the node 102 from potential cyber-security threats associatedwith the storage device 402.

A determination is made whether the storage device is trusted(checked-in) or whitelisted at step 1008. Whitelisting may be desired,for instance, to allow certain devices or types of devices (like USBkeyboards, USB mice, biometric devices, or security keys) to be usedwithout requiring check-in. If not, access to the storage device isblocked and the event is logged at step 1010, and the method 1000 ends.In that case, the SMX agent 103 cannot tell the status of the storagedevice 402, so the SMX agent 103 blocks usage of the storage device 402.Again, this may help to prevent the storage device 402 from being usedby the protected system node 102 in order to protect the node 102. Insome embodiments, the system can be configured to disable USB devices orother devices by default to minimize an attacker's ability to bypass thecontrol mechanisms using an unexpected device type, such as USB-basedmicroprocessors (also called “rubber duckies”).

If the storage device is trusted or whitelisted, the SMX agent 103allows usage of the storage device 402, and attempted file activity isdetected at step 1012. This could include, for example, the SMX agent103 detecting that the protected system node 102 is attempting to accessor copy a file stored on the storage device 402. If so, the SMX agentdetermines whether the file is a clean file at step 1014. This couldinclude, for example, the SMX agent 103 determining whether the file isdigitally signed and possibly encrypted as expected, such as byverifying whether the file has a current hash value that matches a priorhash value stored in a hidden file. If not, access to the file isblocked, and the requested file activity does not occur and could belogged. If so, access to the file is permitted, and the desired fileactivity occurs at step 1016. Once the file activity occurs or if thefile activity is blocked, the audit log is updated at step 1018. Thiscould include, for example, the SMX agent 103 updating the audit log onthe storage device 402 with information related to the action(s) beingperformed.

Note that steps 1012-1018 could be performed any number of times asfiles on the storage device 402 are accessed or copied and as new filesare added to the storage device 402. When the storage device 402 islater coupled to an SMX kiosk 104 for check-out, the audit log(s) on thestorage device 402 can be retrieved by the SMX server 105 and sent tothe security manager 108 or other devices or systems, such as via one ormore secure network connections. Examples of other devices or systemscan include log collection and analysis tools designed for use within aparticular protected system. One specific example can include sendingaudit logs within an industrial automation and control system to aHONEYWELL RISK MANAGER, where threat intelligence and audit activitiesprovided by the logs can be translated into indicators of cyber-securityrisks.

Also note that whitelisting and blacklisting of devices or device typescould occur in any suitable manner. For example, each SMX agent 103could support an administrative action that configures the SMX agentduring initial deployment in order to identify a device type, model,vendor, brand, or other identifying parameter(s). Devices or devicetypes could be defined generally (such as “keyboards”) or specifically(such as by specific USB or other device identifiers, vendoridentifiers, serial numbers, or other suitable identifiers). A whitelistor blacklist can denote a structured file that is encrypted, signed, andstored securely on a protected node. The SMX agent 103 could alsosupport a mechanism by which an administrative override may be givenafter initial deployment (which is described in FIG. 11), allowing thewhitelist or blacklist to be altered as needed or desired.

In addition, note that whitelists and blacklists could be used invarious ways by SMX agents 103 to support the use of peripheral devices.For example, in some embodiments, a whitelist or blacklist can beencrypted and digitally signed, such as with a hash value. An SMX agent103 can verify the hash value and decrypt the whitelist or blacklist,and the contents of the whitelist or blacklist could be loaded into oneor more filters upon successful verification and decryption. When aperipheral device is coupled to a protected node 102, the SMX agent 103can compare one or more device parameters from the peripheral device todevice parameters in the one or more filters in order to determinewhether the peripheral device is allowed or blocked. Of course, otherapproaches for using the whitelists and blacklists could also be used.

Depending on the implementation, it may be desired or required toprovide some sort of agent-side management for whitelists and blackliststhat are used by SMX agents 103. This may allow, for example, anadministrator or other user to authorize the use of a specific whitelistor blacklist by an SMX agent 103. In some embodiments, the SMX agent 103could require suitable authorization from an administrator or other userbefore allowing use of a specific whitelist or blacklist. In particularembodiments, the specific whitelist or blacklist could be digitallysigned (such as with a hash value) by the SMX agent 103 after receivingappropriate authorization from the user. The SMX agent 103 could lateruse the digital signature when accessing a whitelist or blacklist toverify that the list has not been illicitly modified.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example method 1100 for configuring or updatingan SMX agent. The method 1100 could, for example, be performed by theSMX agent 103 after the SMX agent 103 determines in step 1008 that astorage device 402 is a trusted or whitelisted storage device. Thisprocess supports changing the operation of the SMX agent 103 after theSMX agent 103 has been deployed in a protected environment.

As shown in FIG. 11, the presence of a configuration file is detected ona trusted storage device at step 1102. This could include, for example,the SMX agent 103 determining that a properly encrypted and signedconfiguration file is present on a trusted storage device 402, such asin a file manifest. A determination is made whether an administrator orother user approves updating or configuring the SMX agent using theconfiguration file at step 1104. This could include, for example, theSMX agent 103 presenting a prompt on the screen of the protected node102.

Assuming the administrator or other user approves, the SMX agent isupdated using the configuration file at step 1106. This could include,for example, the SMX agent 103 updating one or more of its ownparameters or operational characteristics using the contents of theconfiguration file. As a particular example, this could include the SMXagent 103 updating one or more whitelists, one or more blacklists, oneor more certificates or private keys, or other data used by the SMXagent 103. An audit log on the storage device is updated at step 1108.This could include, for example, the SMX agent 103 updating one or moreaudit logs on the storage device 402 to identify the configurationchange being implemented by the SMX agent 103.

The configuration file can be used here to override or update a settingof the SMX agent 103 after initial deployment of the SMX agent 103. Forexample, if an administrator wants to add a new device or device type toa whitelist or blacklist, the configuration file can be used to updatethe whitelist or blacklist of the SMX agent 103 with the new device ordevice type. This allows the operation of the SMX agent 103 to beupdated without having to change the actual driver implementing the SMXagent 103. Note that the override or update to the setting(s) of the SMXagent 103 could permanently override or update the setting(s) of the SMXagent 103, or the override or update could denote a one-time or otherlimited-time override or update (such as when the override or updateoccurs only for this particular storage device 402). Of course, othermechanisms could also be used to override or update an SMX agent 103.

Note that this approach for supporting the override or update of SMXagent settings can support additional security mechanisms at the localprotected node 102 in order to prevent the configuration mechanism frombeing used as an attack vector. For example, additional checksums may beused by the SMX agents 103 to prevent illicit modification ofwhitelists, blacklists, or other SMX agent settings.

Although FIGS. 8 through 11 illustrate examples of methods supportingsecure data transfer into and out of protected systems using removablemedia, various changes may be made to FIGS. 8 through 11. For example,various steps in each figure could overlap, occur in parallel, occur ina different order, or occur any number of times.

FIGS. 12 and 13 illustrate example methods supporting applications thatinvolve secure data transfer into and out of protected systems usingremovable media according to this disclosure. For ease of explanation,the methods shown in FIGS. 12 and 13 are described with respect to thesystem 100 of FIG. 1. However, the methods shown in FIGS. 12 and 13could be used in any other suitable system, such as the system 200 ofFIG. 2.

One problem often experienced with protected systems is that it isdifficult to move valid data or files into and out of the protectedsystems. For example, protected systems are often isolated from externalnetworks such as the Internet, which can make it difficult to updateapplications executed by the protected system nodes 102 a-102 n withapplication patches or other information. As a particular example, itcan be very difficult to keep anti-virus or anti-malware applications onprotected system nodes 102 a-102 n up to date with the latest threatintelligence.

One example use of a storage device 402 in a system such as the onesshown in FIGS. 1 and 2 involves providing threat intelligence (such asreputation feeds, malware signature updates, and cloud-based threatsandboxing technologies) to protected systems. Ordinarily, threatintelligence is difficult to provide to a protected system. Threatintelligence typically depends on continuous Internet access, which theprotected system often does not have.

FIG. 12 illustrates an example method 1200 for secure data transfer ofthreat intelligence into protected systems using removable media. Themethod 1200 could, for example, be performed using the storage device402 along with an SMX server 105 and SMX agents 103. This process allowsthreat intelligence to be securely provided to protected nodes 102 a-102n in a protected environment.

As shown in FIG. 12, threat intelligence data is obtained using an SMXserver at step 1202. This may include, for example, one or more SMXservers 105 supporting scheduled or manual downloads to obtain neededthreat intelligence from one or more external sources. Because the SMXserver 105 can be located outside of a system being protected, the SMXserver 105 can be connected directly to one or more threat intelligencesources, such as HONEYWELL's MANAGED SECURITY SERVICES CENTER (MSSC),HONEYWELL's INDUSTRIAL CYBER SECURITY LABORATORY, anti-virus updateservers, cloud threat services, or commercial threat intelligence feeds.Using a secure network connection such as a Virtual Private Network(VPN) connection, the SMX server 105 can download data updates accordingto its specific configuration and store the data in a unique directoryin its local file system.

The collected threat intelligence data is processed for local storage bythe SMX server at step 1204. This could include, for example, the SMXserver 105 performing a series of tasks, such as checking existing filehashes to determine if files are trusted, scanning untrusted files toensure that they are not malicious, and signing files (once validated)to ensure that they are not modified after they have been scanned. Theseries of tasks could also include packaging files locally to preservespace, creating a configuration notification message to update the SMXagents 103, and tracking access to packaged update files locally. TheSMX server 105 here can use local file scanning and checksums to ensurethat downloaded information is not itself corrupt or infected withmalware. In addition, the SMX server 105 here could use a tracking tableor database to log which files are available, when the files becameavailable, when the files were copied into a protected system, whatprotected nodes received the files, and who copied the files to theprotected nodes.

An administrator or other personnel are notified about the availabilityof the threat intelligence data at step 1206. This could include, forexample, the SMX server 105 notifying an administrator that one or moreupdates are available. This could be done in any suitable manner, suchas via email or text message. An administrator could also be notifiedvia a notification message inserted onto a storage device 402 by the SMXserver 105. When that storage device 402 is connected to a protectedsystem node 102, the SMX agent 103 on the protected system node 102could identify the notification message and transmit a notification tothe security manager 108, threat analysis server 112, or otherdestination(s). The notification can identify the availability of anupdate.

However notified, an administrator or other personnel can connect astorage device to the SMX server and gain access to the validated files,and the storage device is detected at step 1208. This could include, forexample, the SMX server 105 detecting insertion or coupling of a storagedevice 402 in or to the removable media interface 310 of the SMX kiosk104. Assuming the copying of the validated files is approved at step1210 (such as via the display of the SMX kiosk 104), the threatintelligence data is copied onto the storage device at step 1212. Thiscould include, for example, the SMX server 105 copying one or morevalidated files containing threat intelligence data onto the storagedevice 402. The validated files can be digitally signed and encrypted sothat they appear as valid files to the SMX agents 103.

Once the storage device is checked-in, the storage device is used toupdate the protected nodes or SMX agents at step 1214. This couldinclude, for example, the personnel carrying the storage device 402safely into a protected system. This could also include the personnelusing the storage device 402 to update the SMX agents 103 of theprotected system nodes 102. The SMX agents 103 could be updated with thethreat intelligence data in the same or similar manner as shown in FIG.11 and described above.

Data associated with the update is logged using the SMX server and theSMX agents at step 1216. This could include, for example, using theauditing capabilities of the SMX servers 105 and the SMX agents 103 todocument the updates of the protected system nodes 102 within theprotected system. For instance, when the storage device 402 containingthe threat intelligence data is checked-out, the SMX server 105 can usethe audit logs of the storage device 402 to identify which protectednodes were updated. This information could also be used in any othersuitable manner, such as for internal auditing to support complianceefforts or to be utilized within broader monitoring and analyticsplatforms like HONEYWELL RISK MANAGER.

In this way, threat intelligence data can be securely stored on achecked-in storage device 402, and the checked-in storage device 402 isused to transport the threat intelligence data to at least one protectedsystem node. Since the storage device 402 has undergone the check-inprocedure, there is little or no risk of the storage device 402containing malware that would infect the at least one protected systemnode. As a result, the threat intelligence data can be provided to theprotected system node(s) in a safe and secure manner Depending on theimplementation of the SMX agents, the protected system nodes, or theprotected system, the personnel might need to update each protectedsystem node individually, or one or a subset of the protected systemnodes could be updated and then provide the update data to otherprotected system nodes.

The same approach can be used to provide any suitable data to protectednodes in a protected system. For example, when normal network access ishighly controlled, it is difficult to maintain management communicationbetween applications and services located outside of the protectedsystem and those located inside of the protected system. The approachdescribed above allows storage devices 402 to be used to transfercommand, control, or configuration parameters or other data in a safemanner.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example method 1300 for secure data transfer ofdata into protected systems using removable media. The method 1300could, for example, be performed using the storage device 402 along withan SMX server 105 and SMX agents 103. This process allows command,control, or configuration parameters or other data to be securelyprovided to protected nodes 102 a-102 n in a protected environment.

As shown in FIG. 13, command, control, or configuration parameters orother data is obtained using an SMX server at step 1302. This mayinclude, for example, one or more SMX servers 105 automaticallyobtaining the data from any suitable source(s). The data could also beobtained manually, such as when an administrator or other personnelprovide the data to the SMX servers 105 via a storage device 402 oridentify one or more network locations from which the data is to beobtained. Although not shown here, the SMX server 105 could scan thedata to ensure that no malware is present, digitally sign the data filescontaining the data, and perform other functions such as those describedabove with respect to FIG. 12.

An administrator or other personnel can connect a storage device to theSMX server, which is detected at step 1304. This could include, forexample, the SMX server 105 detecting insertion or coupling of a storagedevice 402 in or to the removable media interface 310 of the SMX kiosk104. Assuming the copying of the data is approved at step 1306 (such asvia the display of the SMX kiosk 104), the data is copied onto thestorage device 402 at step 1308. This could include, for example, theSMX server 105 copying one or more data files containing the data ontothe storage device 402. The data files can be digitally signed andencrypted so that they appear as valid files to the SMX agents 103.

Once the storage device is checked-in, the storage device is used toupdate the protected nodes or SMX agents at step 1310. This couldinclude, for example, the personnel carrying the storage device 402safely into a protected system. This could also include the personnelusing the storage device 402 to update the SMX agents 103, otherapplications, or other components of the protected system nodes 102. TheSMX agents 103, other applications, or other components could be updatedwith the data in the same or similar manner as shown in FIG. 11 anddescribed above.

Data associated with the update is logged using the SMX server and theSMX agents at step 1312. This could include, for example, using theauditing capabilities of the SMX servers 105 and the SMX agents 103 todocument the updates of the protected system nodes 102 within theprotected system. For instance, when the storage device 402 ischecked-out, the SMX server 105 can use the audit logs of the storagedevice 402 to identify which protected nodes received the data. Thisinformation could also be used in any other suitable manner, such as forinternal auditing to support compliance efforts or to be utilized withinbroader monitoring and analytics platforms like HONEYWELL RISK MANAGER.

This approach does not introduce new security threats and forms part ofa larger secure information transfer system. The information beingtransported on the storage devices 402 can be strongly encrypted so thatit cannot be easily intercepted and manipulated by unauthorized actors.To support this transfer, management parameters (such as configurationoptions, commands, or other data) or other information can be sent froman SMX server 105 to one or more protected nodes having the SMX agents103. These components support the use of protected removable media ormodified file sharing to transfer the management parameters or otherinformation between the SMX server 105 and the SMX agents 103.

Although FIGS. 12 and 13 illustrate examples of methods supportingapplications that involve secure data transfer into and out of protectedsystems using removable media, various changes may be made to FIGS. 12and 13. For example, various steps in each figure could overlap, occurin parallel, occur in a different order, or occur any number of times.Also, FIGS. 12 and 13 represent two example applications in which securedata transfers can occur using removable media. However, the mechanismsfor secure data transfers into and out of protected systems described inthis patent document could be used to support any other or additionaldata transfers.

Among other things, the systems, devices, and techniques described inthis patent document support the following features, which can be usedindividually or in any suitable combination:

-   -   the ability to control how files are moved into and out of a        protected system over removable media so that there is some        assurance that the files are “safe” (not infected with computer        viruses or other malware) and are “authorized” (allowed and        intended to be transferred into or out of a secure network);    -   the ability to control what removable media are allowed within a        protected system and to help ensure that media are used only for        intended purposes;    -   the ability to “check in” removable media in order to (i) ensure        that each is an authorized device, (ii) ensure that each is        accessible to computers utilizing an SMX agent, and (iii) ensure        that each is not then used for other purposes until such time as        it is “checked out”;    -   the ability to control which files are determined to be “safe”        and therefore allowed to be transferred to a protected node        within a protected system;    -   the ability to ensure that only files that are authorized are        allowed to be copied onto, executed by, or otherwise used by a        protected node within a protected system;    -   the ability to whitelist certain devices or types of devices        (such as USB keyboards, USB mice, biometric devices, or security        keys) so that such devices can be used without requiring        check-in;    -   the ability to blacklist certain devices or types of devices so        that such devices cannot be used even if checked-in;    -   the ability to introduce threat intelligence updates into a        protected system using secure storage devices;    -   the ability to transfer management parameters or other data        between devices in a secure manner; and    -   the ability to audit which files are introduced to which nodes        within a protected system via removable media, including        pertinent details of the file I/O (such as the active user,        date, time, source file and target system information).

In some embodiments, various functions described in this patent documentare implemented or supported by a computer program that is formed fromcomputer readable program code and that is embodied in a computerreadable medium. The phrase “computer readable program code” includesany type of computer code, including source code, object code, andexecutable code. The phrase “computer readable medium” includes any typeof medium capable of being accessed by a computer, such as read onlymemory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), a hard disk drive, a compactdisc (CD), a digital video disc (DVD), or any other type of memory. A“non-transitory” computer readable medium excludes wired, wireless,optical, or other communication links that transport transitoryelectrical or other signals. A non-transitory computer readable mediumincludes media where data can be permanently stored and media where datacan be stored and later overwritten, such as a rewritable optical discor an erasable storage device.

It may be advantageous to set forth definitions of certain words andphrases used throughout this patent document. The terms “application”and “program” refer to one or more computer programs, softwarecomponents, sets of instructions, procedures, functions, objects,classes, instances, related data, or a portion thereof adapted forimplementation in a suitable computer code (including source code,object code, or executable code). The term “communicate,” as well asderivatives thereof, encompasses both direct and indirect communication.The terms “include” and “comprise,” as well as derivatives thereof, meaninclusion without limitation. The term “or” is inclusive, meaningand/or. The phrase “associated with,” as well as derivatives thereof,may mean to include, be included within, interconnect with, contain, becontained within, connect to or with, couple to or with, be communicablewith, cooperate with, interleave, juxtapose, be proximate to, be boundto or with, have, have a property of, have a relationship to or with, orthe like. The phrase “at least one of,” when used with a list of items,means that different combinations of one or more of the listed items maybe used, and only one item in the list may be needed. For example, “atleast one of: A, B, and C” includes any of the following combinations:A, B, C, A and B, A and C, B and C, and A and B and C.

The description in the present application should not be read asimplying that any particular element, step, or function is an essentialor critical element that must be included in the claim scope. The scopeof patented subject matter is defined only by the allowed claims.Moreover, none of the claims invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) with respect toany of the appended claims or claim elements unless the exact words“means for” or “step for” are explicitly used in the particular claim,followed by a participle phrase identifying a function. Use of termssuch as (but not limited to) “mechanism,” “module,” “device,” “unit,”“component,” “element,” “member,” “apparatus,” “machine,” “system,”“processor,” or “controller” within a claim is understood and intendedto refer to structures known to those skilled in the relevant art, asfurther modified or enhanced by the features of the claims themselves,and is not intended to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).

While this disclosure has described certain embodiments and generallyassociated methods, alterations and permutations of these embodimentsand methods will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly,the above description of example embodiments does not define orconstrain this disclosure. Other changes, substitutions, and alterationsare also possible without departing from the spirit and scope of thisdisclosure, as defined by the following claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. An apparatus comprising: at least one interfaceconfigured to be coupled to a peripheral device; and at least oneprocessing device configured to: detect the peripheral device; determinewhether the peripheral device has been checked-in for use with at leastthe apparatus; determine whether the peripheral device or a device typeassociated with the peripheral device has been whitelisted orblacklisted; grant access to the peripheral device in response to atleast one of: determining that the peripheral device has been checked-infor use with at least the apparatus and has not been blacklisted; anddetermining that the peripheral device or the device type has beenwhitelisted, even if the peripheral device has not been checked-in foruse with at least the apparatus; determine, after access to theperipheral device is granted, whether a file on the peripheral devicehas been checked-in for use with at least the apparatus; grantmeaningful access to the file on the peripheral device in response todetermining that the file has been checked-in for use with at least theapparatus; block meaningful access to the file on the peripheral devicein response to determining that the file has not been checked-in for usewith at least the apparatus; and block access to the peripheral devicein response to at least one of: determining that the peripheral devicehas not been checked-in for use with at least the apparatus and has notbeen whitelisted; and determining that the peripheral device or thedevice type has been blacklisted, even if the peripheral device has beenchecked-in for use with at least the apparatus.
 2. The apparatus ofclaim 1, wherein: the at least one processing device is furtherconfigured to update at least one of a whitelist and a blacklist; andthe at least one processing device is configured to use at least one ofthe whitelist and the blacklist when determining whether the peripheraldevice or the device type has been whitelisted or blacklisted.
 3. Theapparatus of claim 2, wherein the at least one processing device isconfigured to update at least one of the whitelist and the blacklistbased on configuration data on the peripheral device.
 4. The apparatusof claim 1, wherein: the at least one processing device is configured todetermine whether the peripheral device or the device type has beenwhitelisted or blacklisted using at least one of: a whitelist and ablacklist; and each of the whitelist and the blacklist comprises one ormore encrypted device parameters.
 5. The apparatus of claim 4, whereinthe device parameters include at least one of: one or more device types,one or more device models, one or more device vendors, and one or moredevice brands.
 6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein: the at least oneprocessing device is configured to determine whether the peripheraldevice or the device type has been whitelisted using a whitelist; andthe whitelist identifies at least one device type that is allowed to beused with at least the apparatus without requiring check-in, the atleast one device type comprising at least one of: one or more keyboards,one or more mice, one or more biometric devices, and one or moresecurity keys.
 7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein to block meaningfulaccess to the file on the peripheral device, the at least one processingdevice is configured to quarantine and lock the file on the peripheraldevice.
 8. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, to determine whether theperipheral device has been checked-in, the at least one processingdevice is configured to at least one of: determine whether a file systemof the peripheral device has been modified in an expected manner; anddetermine whether the peripheral device has an expected digitalsignature.
 9. A method comprising: detecting a peripheral device at aprotected node; determining whether the peripheral device has beenchecked-in for use with at least the protected node; determining whetherthe peripheral device or a device type associated with the peripheraldevice has been whitelisted or blacklisted; granting access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of: determining that theperipheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and has not been blacklisted; and determining that theperipheral device or the device type has been whitelisted, even if theperipheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node; determining, after access to the peripheral device isgranted, whether a file on the peripheral device has been checked-in foruse with at least the protected node; granting meaningful access to thefile on the peripheral device in response to determining that the filehas been checked-in for use with at least the protected node; blockingmeaningful access to the file on the peripheral device in response todetermining that the file has not been checked-in for use with at leastthe protected node; and blocking access to the peripheral device inresponse to at least one of: determining that the peripheral device hasnot been checked-in for use with at least the protected node and has notbeen whitelisted; and determining that the peripheral device or thedevice type has been blacklisted, even if the peripheral device has beenchecked-in for use with at least the protected node.
 10. The method ofclaim 9, further comprising: updating at least one of a whitelist and ablacklist used to determine whether the peripheral device or the devicetype has been whitelisted or blacklisted.
 11. The method of claim 10,wherein at least one of the whitelist and the blacklist is updated basedon configuration data on the peripheral device.
 12. The method of claim9, wherein: determining whether the peripheral device or the device typehas been whitelisted or blacklisted comprises using at least one of: awhitelist and a blacklist; and each of the whitelist and the blacklistcomprises one or more encrypted device parameters.
 13. The method ofclaim 9, wherein: determining whether the peripheral device or thedevice type has been whitelisted comprises using a whitelist; and thewhitelist identifies at least one device type that is allowed to be usedwith at least the protected node without requiring check-in, the atleast one device type comprising at least one of: one or more keyboards,one or more mice, one or more biometric devices, and one or moresecurity keys.
 14. The method of claim 9, wherein blocking meaningfulaccess to the file on the peripheral device comprises quarantining andlocking the file on the peripheral device.
 15. The method of claim 9,wherein determining whether the peripheral device has been checked-incomprises at least one of: determining whether a file system of theperipheral device has been modified in an expected manner; anddetermining whether the peripheral device has an expected digitalsignature.
 16. A non-transitory computer readable medium containinginstructions that, when executed by at least one processing device,cause the at least one processing device to: detect a peripheral deviceat a protected node; determine whether the peripheral device has beenchecked-in for use with at least the protected node; determine whetherthe peripheral device or a device type associated with the peripheraldevice has been whitelisted or blacklisted; grant access to theperipheral device in response to at least one of: determining that theperipheral device has been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node and has not been blacklisted; and determining that theperipheral device or the device type has been whitelisted, even if theperipheral device has not been checked-in for use with at least theprotected node; determine, after access to the peripheral device isgranted, whether a file on the peripheral device has been checked-in foruse with at least the apparatus; grant meaningful access to the file onthe peripheral device in response to determining that the file has beenchecked-in for use with at least the apparatus; block meaningful accessto the file on the peripheral device in response to determining that thefile has not been checked-in for use with at least the apparatus; andblock access to the peripheral device in response to at least one of:determining that the peripheral device has not been checked-in for usewith at least the protected node and has not been whitelisted; anddetermining that the peripheral device or the device type has beenblacklisted, even if the peripheral device has been checked-in for usewith at least the protected node.
 17. The non-transitory computerreadable medium of claim 16, further containing instructions that, whenexecuted by the at least one processing device, cause the at least oneprocessing device to: update at least one of a whitelist and a blacklistused to determine whether the peripheral device or the device type hasbeen whitelisted or blacklisted.
 18. The non-transitory computerreadable medium of claim 17, wherein the update to at least one of thewhitelist and the blacklist comprises a one-time update to the whitelistin order to allow the peripheral device to be used with the protectednode once without requiring check-in of the peripheral device.
 19. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 16, wherein: theinstructions that when executed cause the at least one processing deviceto determine whether the peripheral device or the device type has beenwhitelisted or blacklisted comprise: instructions that when executedcause the at least one processing device to determine whether theperipheral device or the device type has been whitelisted or blacklistedusing at least one of: a whitelist and a blacklist; and each of thewhitelist and the blacklist comprises one or more encrypted deviceparameters.
 20. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 16,wherein: the instructions that when executed cause the at least oneprocessing device to determine whether the peripheral device or thedevice type has been whitelisted comprise: instructions that whenexecuted cause the at least one processing device to determine whetherthe peripheral device or the device type has been whitelisted using awhitelist; and the whitelist identifies at least one device type that isallowed to be used with at least the protected node without requiringcheck-in, the at least one device type comprising at least one of: oneor more keyboards, one or more mice, one or more biometric devices, andone or more security keys.